The Limits of the Market-wide Limits of Arbitrage: Insights from the Dynamics of 100 Anomalies by JACOBS, Hieiko
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection BNP Paribas Hedge Fund
Centre BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre
1-2014
The Limits of the Market-wide Limits of Arbitrage:
Insights from the Dynamics of 100 Anomalies
Hieiko JACOBS
University of Mannheim
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/bnp_research
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre by an authorized administrator of
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
JACOBS, Hieiko. (2014). Research Collection BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre. , 1.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/bnp_research/37
The limits of the market-wide limits of arbitrage:
Insights from the dynamics of 100 anomalies
Heiko Jacobs
Abstract
Are anomalies strongest when limits of arbitrage are widely considered to be greatest? We em-
pirically explore this theoretically deducted prediction. We rst identify, categorize, and replicate
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1. Introduction
The behavioral nance view on the existence of asset pricing anomalies in the cross-
section of expected equity returns is based on two building blocks (e.g. Barberis and
Thaler (2003)): Investor psychology, which allows mispricings to arise, and limits to ar-
bitrage, which prevent sophisticated market participants from quickly exploiting these
ineciencies. A testable prediction of this theoretically deducted mechanism is that ab-
normal returns should ceteris paribus be stronger in settings where arbitrageurs are less
capable of or willing to aggressively bet against irrationality-induced mispricings (see e.g.
the discussions in Brav et al. (2010) or Hanson and Sunderan (2013)). Empirical tests
might help academics to enrich or challenge our understanding of the price discovery
process and oer practitioners insights into ways to optimize their investment process.
However, recent work reveals that the evidence is in fact far from conclusive. We aim
to revisit this controversial debate. What separates this paper from previous work is the
breadth of anomalies taken into account as well as the focus on time-series (as opposed
to cross-sectional) variation in market-level (as opposed to anomaly-level or stock-level)
arbitrage constraints. This approach enables us to yield some novel insights into the
following questions: When considered jointly, which type of phenomena yields the highest
seemingly abnormal returns in which situations? To what extent do widely employed
proxies for time-varying market-level limits to arbitrage have explanatory power for the
magnitude of anomalous returns in the time-series?
More precisely, our contribution is twofold. First, we synthesize information from a very
broad range of potential ineciencies. We identify, categorize, and replicate 100 well-
known or recently discovered anomalies related to violations of the law of one price,
momentum, technical analysis, short-term reversal, long-term reversal, calendar eects,
lead-lag eects among economically linked rms, pairs trading, beta, nancial distress,
skewness, dierences of opinion, industry eects, fundamental analysis, net stock and
nancing decisions, capital investment and rm growth, innovation, accruals, dividend
payments, or earnings surprises. We believe that these phenomena cover a reasonably
representative universe of cross-sectional stock anomalies discussed in the literature.
Considering all these anomalies simultaneously in a unied framework oers a number
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of advantages. Most asset pricing studies concentrate on only one or few anomalies, and
methodological or other dierences can have a massive impact on inferences (e.g. Fama and
French (2008)), making comparisons often dicult. In his literature review of predictors
of cross-sectional stock returns, Subrahmanyam (2010) thus concludes that the \picture
remains murky and suggests a need for clarifying studies" (p. 28). Similarly, Richardson
et al. (2010) criticize the \haphazard nature" of this line of research and argue that \to
date very few papers have made a serious attempt to bring some structure to the anomaly
literature"(p. 422). Our approach aims at progressing on this front.
One of the most critical issues in this context appears to be the treatment of micro
caps and small caps. As Fama and French (2008) highlight: \From a general economic
perspective, it is important to know whether anomalous patters in returns are marketwide
or limited to illiquid stocks that represent a small portion of market wealth" (p. 1655).
Importantly, these stocks might also obstruct the view on the economic importance of
arbitrage constraints. As the literature review in section 2 shows, several recent cross-
sectional studies provide at best little support for the limits to arbitrage rationale once
small stocks are controlled for. In light of these concerns, we apply the same lter rules on
size and liquidity as e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). This results in excluding about
50% of the rm months of common stocks in the CRSP database, which however account
for a maximum of a few percent of the total market capitalization. Our approach thus
enables us to rely on a stock universe which is comparable across anomalies and which
moreover represents the economically meaningful fraction of the market only. By using
this common basis for a broad set of nancial market phenomena, we also add to a lively
debate about the real-life relevance of limits to arbitrage (see section 2).
Our second contribution is that we take a time-series perspective and focus on market-wide
arbitrage constraints. In contrast, most existing tests have focused on the cross-section
of specic anomalies and on stock-level constraints. In other words, this work typically
compares the strength of return predictability in portfolios sorted on measures such as
idiosyncratic risk, analyst coverage, rm age, or rm size. As we will show, these studies
have partly arrived at conicting ndings. Alternative research designs such as ours might
help to paint a more comprehensive picture.
Building on a literature review, we start by constructing a set of widely employed proxies
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for time-varying market-level arbitrage constraints. In our baseline analysis, these com-
prise the Vix, average idiosyncratic volatility, the Ted spread, the Moody's credit spread,
average bid-ask spreads, and market illiquidity. We then test to what extent these popular
proxies can indeed explain the magnitude of return anomalies over time.
Our main insights can be summarized as follows. From an unconditional perspective, most
anomalies produce economically large abnormal returns relative to a Fama and French
(1993) model. As a rough estimate, and averaged across time and anomalies, abnormal
monthly returns are about 70 to 80 basis points (bp). This is noteworthy as, compared to
many original studies, our data screens are often stricter. Moreover, our sample period is
often longer or more recent, and thus partly out-of-sample. These ndings suggest that
most anomalous returns uncovered in the literature are unlikely to be primarily driven by
statistical biases (see also McLean and Ponti (2013) and Green et al. (2013)).
In line with theoretical predictions and previous empirical work (e.g. Mitchell and Pulvino
(2012)), we indeed nd that the few relatively unambiguous deviations from the law one
price exhibit a strong positive link to market-level variables widely thought to proxy for
time-varying limits of arbitrage. Strikingly, these variables turn out to be, at best, loosely
related to the large time-variation of most other anomalies. In fact, anomaly returns only
load sporadically on market-wide arbitrage risk factors in a statistically and economically
signicant matter in the direction suggested by theory. In many cases, abnormal returns on
long-short anomalies are about as large in (or following) periods often argued to represent
phases of high market-level limits to arbitrage as they are in (or following) periods widely
considered to be characterized by only few impediments to arbitrage.
This has important implications. First, it seems that the factors that cause time-varying
deviations from theoretical price parity are not necessarily the same factors that cause time
variation in many cross-sectional anomalies. Thus, it appears that one cannot infer from
these special cases alone to which extent market-level limits to arbitrage generally matter
in stock markets. Second, our results reveal that anomalies constructed from relatively
large and liquid stocks often generate highly signicant abnormal returns of roughly 30 to
100 bp per month even in phases when popular proxies indicate low market frictions. This
arguably presents a challenge to widely employed behavioral or rational theories aimed
at explaining the existence and survival of these return patterns in the data. Behavioral
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theories need to explain why an economically large part of many anomaly returns does
not seem to be directly related to widely used proxies for market-wide limits to arbitrage.
Rational theories need to identify systematic risk factors which have a strong impact on
expected returns even when overall market conditions appear calm, stocks are large and
liquid, and the spectrum of return premiums appears conceptually very diverse.
Essentially, the main nding of this paper is a non-result. This raises concerns about
errors-in-variables, sample selection issues, and related aspects. However, our ndings
survive a number of robustness checks. Among others, we use changes instead of levels, run
regressions quarterly instead of monthly, use alternative proxies, and control for general
time eects and outliers. Moreover, aggregate market-level arbitrage conditions also lack
explanatory power for time-varying anomaly-level arbitrage popularity. We thereby draw
on recent studies which propose that time-series shocks in the amount of capital and eort
allocated to specic quantitative anomalies can be measured using time-series shocks in
the cross-section of short interest (e.g. Hanson and Sunderan (2013), Hwang and Liu
(2012)) or trading activity (e.g. McLean and Ponti (2013)). The underlying rationale
is that unobservable changes in arbitrage activity are likely to manifest themselves in
observable changes in the behavior or characteristics of stocks which a specic quantitative
trading strategy would typically speculate on.
It is important to put our ndings into perspective and to highlight some limitations
of our study. Clearly, due to the aggregate nature of our study, we are limited in our
ability to consider the economic stories and arbitrage forces behind all 100 anomalies in
detail. However, it is exactly the lack of comparability, consensus, or even existence of
previous work regarding the impact of limits to arbitrage on individual anomalies which
has motivated our large-scale analysis. We hope that our insights on the \big picture"
might serve as a fruitful starting point for future research, which could explore the precise
mechanism of selected issues (see e.g. the discussion below) in more depth.
We are far from claiming that limits to arbitrage in general do not matter. For instance,
arbitrage constraints have extensively and convincingly been shown to be often binding
for small, illiquid rms. However, these stocks are less meaningful from an economic
perspective and thus less relevant for our purpose. It might also be the case that anomaly-
level or stock-level arbitrage constraints are more important than market-level constraints.
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Alternatively, market-level constraints might matter, but the proxies we rely on might not
adequately capture impediments to arbitrage. Both arguments might be justied, even
though the literature so far seems to oer little insights in this matter. However, the proxies
we rely on mostly have a solid theoretical foundation, they have already been extensively
employed in previous empirical studies, and they are able to explain deviations of the law
of one price. On the other hand, if one assumes that the many other return phenomena
covered in this study (also) represent true mispricings, then clearly some (other) forms of
powerful frictions are required in order to convincingly explain their survival and time-
variation in the data. Validating this assumption and identifying the precise nature of
these (potentially anomaly-specic) frictions is beyond the scope of this study.
However, we do show that one often cited source of such frictions, market-wide arbitrage
barriers, has, taken as a whole, surprisingly little power to explain the dynamics of a
very large set of return phenomena which are often referred to as puzzling anomalies
in the literature. Even though this \big picture" evidence is by no means conclusive,
our ndings might potentially be best interpreted as supporting the small, but growing
empirical literature which uncovers some shortcomings of the limits to arbitrage argument.
2. Existing Evidence For And Against Limits To Arbitrage
There appear to be two major streams of empirical literature which document limits to
arbitrage in the stock market. The rst stream analyzes a set of anomalies concerned
with the relative prices of assets with very similar payos. These settings are often re-
ferred to as (reasonably accurate) tests of the law of one price, and the literature argues
that impediments to arbitrage are the major reason for the persistence of deviations from
theoretical price parity. Arguably among the best documented cases are price parity de-
viations of dual-listed companies (\Siamese Twins") (e.g. Rosenthal and Young (1990),
Froot and Dabora (1999), Scruggs (2007), Jong et al. (2009), Baker et al. (2012)). Another
well documented setting is the relationship of the prices of closed-end fund shares and
the per share market value of the assets held by the funds (e.g. Lee et al. (1991), Ponti
(1996), Chay and Trzcinka (1999), and Cherkes et al. (2009)). Recent evidence comes from
cross-listed stocks (Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), Seasholes and Liu (2011)) and dual-class
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shares (Schultz and Shive (2010)). We later consider all these anomalies in our empirical
tests. A drawback of these settings is that they are, by denition, special. Due to the
scarcity of asset pairs with closely related payos, this literature typically can build only
on a limited number of observations, both in the cross-section and in the time-series.
The second stream analyzes selected anomalies and thereby mostly takes a cross-sectional
perspective. These studies typically argue that abnormal returns related to a specic
anomaly are most pronounced for rms that are most dicult to arbitrage, proxied by e.g.
rm-level idiosyncratic risk.1 While this literature is quite large, some of its implications
have recently been put into question from two sides.
First, there seem to be methodological issues. For instance, in a cross-sectional study
with several anomalies, Brav et al. (2010) conclude that several previous studies which
identify a positive correlation between limits to arbitrage and abnormal returns primarily
do so because they rely on \research designs with non-implementable trading strategies
(high frequency trading of very small cap securities and event-time analysis)" (p. 161).
In their more conservative research setting, many of their tests \fail to support the limits
of arbitrage argument" (p. 157). With regard to the asset growth anomaly, Lam and
Wei (2011) show that value-weighted results provide only limited support for limits to
arbitrage. Similarly, and \in sharp contrast" (p. 531) to previous U.S. studies, Watanabe
et al. (2012) nd only a very weak link to cross-country measures of limits to arbitrage.
Second, practitioners do not always seem to behave in the way predicted by academia.
Inuential academic work on limits to arbitrage in the cross-section is build on the long-
standing, theoretically deducted argument that arbitrageurs will allocate less capital to
stocks with higher idiosyncratic return volatility (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Ponti
(2006)). However, Ben-David et al. (2010) nd that hedge funds ceteris paribus actually
invest more capital in these stocks, leading them to conclude: \Our results show that
diversication concerns of arbitrageurs are not the primary reason why pricing anomalies
are more pronounced among high idiosyncratic risk stocks" (p. 3). Similarly, Green et al.
(2011) study hedge fund behavior and conclude with regard to the limits of arbitrage ar-
1Selected papers and anomalies include the book-to-market eect (Ali et al. (2003)), momentum (Arena et al. (2008),
Zhang (2006)), accounting anomalies such as asset growth or accruals (Mashruwala et al. (2006)), Lipson et al. (2012), Li
and Sullivan (2011)), or the post-earnings-announcement drift (Mendenhall (2004)).
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gument: The results \substantiate statements made by key practitioners that run counter
to predictions made by some academics" (p. 813).
Moreover, there is little consensus on to what extent the rapid growth of the arbitrage
industry has aected anomaly returns, which to some extent might also allow to draw
inferences about the impact of limits to arbitrage. For instance, Hanson and Sunderan
(2013) analyze value and momentum strategies and arrive at the following conclusion:
\We provide evidence that this increase in capital has resulted in lower strategy returns"
(p. 29, see also Schwert (2003)). In contrast, Israel and Moskowitz (2012) conclude that
there is \little evidence that size, value, or momentum premia have changed over time or
are aected by changes in institutional or hedge fund participation in markets" (p. 26).
Similarly, Chordia et al. (2013) show that abnormal returns for their twelve anomalies are
much lower in their second subperiod, whereas Haugen and Baker (1996) do not nd a
pronounced time trend. Somewhere in the middle are the intriguing ndings of McLean
and Ponti (2013) who analyze 72 anomalies and report on average a 35% post-publication
decline in anomalous returns. We later control for time and publication eects.
In summary, one can say that the evidence is mixed. Recent work shows that the literature
on limits to arbitrage does have its shortcomings, suggesting the need for clarifying studies.
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Anomalies
Our approach involves identifying, categorizing, and replicating stock market anomalies.2
We consider papers published in major nance, accounting, and economics journals as well
as selected working papers. Not all studies explicitly refer to their ndings as anomalies.
We principally take papers into account which report excess returns relative to (at least)
a standard Fama and French (1993) three-factor model or comparable benchmarks, and
2Note that, due to e.g. our data screens, partly missing details about precise calculations in the original work, dierent
methodologies, our own modications, or database changes over time, we do not intend to and cannot perfectly replicate
studies on specic anomalies. We can, however, at least closely follow the economic intuition, and thereby also most likely
preserve the basic risk-return characteristics of the original anomaly.
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which do not prominently advocate an explanation based on rational risk factors. In the
following, we implicitly assume that the consensus view of quantitative arbitrageurs is
that these excess returns indeed represent potentially exploitable alpha.
To keep the analysis manageable, meaningful, and of practical relevance, we impose several
screens. First, the anomaly can be computed using standard databases (mostly CRSP,
Compustat, and I/B/E/S). Second, the anomaly is existent at a monthly frequency in real-
time. Third, the anomaly needs to yield seemingly abnormal returns when the universe of
eligible stocks is restricted to rms whose market capitalization at the point of portfolio
formation is larger than the rst NYSE decile and whose stock price is at least 5 USD (see
e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). This also implies that anomalies which historically are
primarily existent among small or highly illiquid stocks do not enter our analysis.
For each anomaly, we compute the traditional long-short zero-cost portfolio approach
based on some form of percentile placement. We construct a long portfolio with the seem-
ingly most undervalued securities (in most cases decile 1 or 10, see the online appendix for
details) and a corresponding short portfolio with the most overvalued stocks. Depending
on the anomaly, portfolios are rebalanced every one to twelve months. We compute both
equally weighted and value weighted returns for the stocks in the extreme portfolios.
Group 1: law of one price As outlined in section 2., we start with deviations of the
law of one price. Specically, we consider return phenomena related to twin stocks (1),
cross-listed shares (2), dual-class shares (3), and closed-end funds (4).
Group 2: momentum Many studies have argued that the traditional momentum eect
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), (5)) can be enhanced once one considers the interaction
of formation period returns with certain stock-level variables. These characteristics are
typically argued to amplify behavioral biases or information uncertainty. We thus also
consider enhanced momentum strategies relying on the following variables: (6) rm age
(e.g. Zhang (2006)), (7) turnover (e.g. Lee and Swaminathan (2000)), (8) market-to-book
ratio (e.g. Asness (1997), Daniel and Titman (1999)), (9) credit rating (e.g. Avramov
et al. (2007)), (10) market capitalization (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Hong et al.
(2000), Zhang (2006)), (11) residual analyst coverage (e.g. Hong et al. (2000)), (12) ana-
lyst forecast dispersion (e.g. Zhang (2006)), (13) R2 (Hou et al. (2006)), (14) formation
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period return consistency (Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004)), (15) (idiosyncratic) volatil-
ity (Zhang (2006), Jiang et al. (2005)), (16) nearness to 52 week high (George and Hwang
(2004)), (17) extremity of formation period returns (e.g. Bandarchuk and Hilscher (2013)),
(18) weighted signed volume (Byun et al. (2013)), (19) change in mutual fund breadth of
ownership (Chen et al. (2002)), (20) continuous information arrival (Da et al. (2013a)),
and (21) intermediate horizon past performance (Novy-Marx (2012)).
Group 3: technical analysis Faced with the large number of potential technical trading
rules, we focus on selected moving average strategies which appear to have been among
the most successful historically (e.g. Huddart et al. (2009), Lo and Wang (2000), Sullivan
et al. (1999)). We form portfolios based on the ratio of the current price to the moving
250 (200) day average price (22, 23). We also run trading strategies based on a dummy
variable indicating whether the stock trades above or below the 250 (200) day average
(24, 25). We also introduce a 25% band around the moving average to reduce the number
of noisy signals (e.g. Brock et al. (1992), 26, 27).
Group 4: short-term return reversal In contrast to the aforementioned anomalies, the
following phenomena are based on negative return autocorrelations. Classical studies such
as Lehmann (1990) or Jegadeesh (1990) demonstrate that the previous month's return
tends to reverse (28). Da et al. (2013b) show that this eect can be enhanced by relying
on industry-adjusted residual returns (29).
Group 5: long-term return reversal In contrast, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) doc-
ument a long-term reversal phenomenon based on a stock's past three to ve year cu-
mulative return (30). Among others, McLean (2010) shows that the eect is particularly
strong among stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility (31).
Group 6: calender-based anomalies Another class of anomalies documents return
predictability for recurring, calendar-based events. Heston and Sadka (2008) show that
stocks tend to have relatively high (or low) returns every year in the same calendar month
(32). Frazzini and Lamont (2007) uncover that rms outperform in months when they
are expected to announce earnings (33). Hartzmark and Solomon (2013) show a similar
phenomenon for months with expected dividend payments (34).
Group 7: lead-lag eects A small literature explores lead-lag eects between economi-
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cally linked stocks. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) document return predictability across well-
dened customer-supplier links (35). Cohen and Lou (2012) uncover that easy-to-analyze
stand-alone rms lead the returns of more complex conglomerates (36).
Group 8: pairs trading Pairs trading (e.g. Gatev et al. (2006), Engelberg et al. (2009))
uses statistical methods to identify pairs of fundamentally linked stocks with no systematic
lead-lag relationship. In essence, pairs trading bets on the future relative performance of
stocks with very similar past performance. We implement four strategies (37-40) which
dier in the maximum holding period of a given pairs trade and the return computation
scheme. In total, we compute over 200 million possible pair combinations and, in each
month, select the top 100 pairs with minimum distance between historical price paths.
Group 9: beta anomalies High-beta stocks underperform low-beta stocks (Baker et al.
(2011), Frazzini and Pedersen (2013), and Hong and Sraer (2012)). We follow Frazzini and
Pedersen (2013) in computing rolling pre-ranking Dimson (1979)-Betas either (41) based
on daily data over one year or (42) based on monthly data over three years. Baker et al.
(2011) extend the ndings also to the use of volatility as a measure of risk. Consequently,
we compute two similar long-short strategies (43, 44).
Group 10: distress risk anomalies Another facet of \the high risk, low return" phe-
nomenon is related to nancial distress. Campbell et al. (2008) (45) use a dynamic logit
model based on a broad set of accounting and market variables to empirically quantify a
rm's failure probability, and show that stocks with high (low) risk of failure underper-
form (outperform). We also consider the static approach of Ohlson (1980) (46) and take
the bankruptcy hazard rate of Shumway (2001) into account (47). Finally, we consider the
insights of e.g. Avramov et al. (2009) or Dichev and Piotroski (2001) who show that the
quality of credit rating levels (48) or changes (49) positively predicts abnormal returns.
Group 11: skewness anomalies A recent, vibrant literature argues that stocks with
lottery-type features tend to underperform. We follow Kumar (2009) in dening (non)-
lottery stocks (50). We also replicate the related ndings of Bali et al. (2011) who show that
stocks with the highest daily return in the previous month underperform (51). Finally, we
consider the regression-based methodology of expected idiosyncratic stock return skewness
as proposed in Boyer et al. (2010) (52).
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Group 12: dierences of opinion Several approaches arrive at the conclusion that
stocks for which dierences of opinion are likely to be high tend to underperform. For
instance, Diether et al. (2002) uncover that dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts
negatively predicts returns (53). Datar et al. (1998) show that turnover negatively predicts
returns, which Lee and Swaminathan (2000) argue to be at least partially related to
behavioral factors (54). Several studies, starting with Ang et al. (2006), suggest that
idiosyncratic risk negatively predicts abnormal returns. As timing has been shown to
matter, we consider three specications: (55) monthly regressions over the preceding 36
months, (56) daily regressions over the preceding 12 months, and (57) daily regressions
over the previous month.
Group 13: anomalies related to industry eects Goetzmann et al. (2012) nd that
procyclical stocks earn higher returns than stocks which comove less with business cycles
(58). Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) uncover that stocks of rms involved in \sin" indus-
tries (alcohol, tobacco, gaming) outperform (59). We also use an alternative classication
scheme based on social ratings provided by KLD (e.g. Statman and Glushkov (2009), 60).
Group 14: fundamental analysisWe compute the composite measures of rm strength
developed in Piotroski (2000) (\F-Score", 61) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) (62).
Moreover, we consider some classical fundamental signals (e.g. Ou and Penman (1989),
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), Abarbanell and Bushee (1997)): the dierence between the
change in sales and inventories (63), the dierence between the change in gross margin
and sales (64), the dierence between the change in selling & administrative expenses
and sales (65), changes in leverage (66), and changes in the gross prot margin (67). We
also consider related recent approaches. Fama and French (2006) nd that more protable
rms have higher expected returns (68) and Novy-Marx (2013) argues that gross prot is
the cleanest accounting measure of true economic protability (69).
Group 15: net stock and nancing anomalies A common behavioral interpretation of
many of the following anomalies is that managers time equity markets by taking advantage
of investor sentiment (e.g. Greenwood and Hanson (2012)) in their corporate nance
decisions (successfully). We replicate the approach of Daniel and Titman (2006) (70),
which synthesizes earlier work (e.g. Ikenberry et al. (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995)) .
Following Fama and French (2008) and Ponti and Woodgate (2008), we use an approach
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based on the yearly change in split-adjusted shares outstanding (71). We also consider the
net external nance measures of Richardson and Sloan (2004) (72) and Bradshaw et al.
(2006) (73), which combine nance activities across dierent capital markets.
Group 16: capital investment and growth anomalies The common theme of a
related set of anomalies is a negative correlation between various forms of rm growth
or capital investment and future stock returns. Faireld (2003) show that growth in net
operating assets is negatively related to future stock returns (74). Similarly, Hirshleifer
et al. (2004) uncover that the level of normalized net operating assets negatively predicts
returns (75). Titman et al. (2004) show that capital investments scaled by total assets
negatively predicts returns (76). Similarly, Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006) focus on
growth in capital expenditures (77), Cooper et al. (2008) on growth of total assets (78).
Finally, Chemmanur and Yan (2009) and Lou (2013) nd that changes in advertising
expenditures negatively predict returns (79).
Group 17: anomalies related to innovation Several phenomena suggest that investors
underreact to or misvalue innovation activities. Chan et al. (2001) show that rms with
a high ratio of r&d to equity market value outperform (80). Similar insights are found
for unexpected increases of r&d activity (Eberhardt et al. (2004), (81)). Gu (2005) shows
that changes in patent citations predicts stock price behavior (82). Finally, innovative
eciency (Hirshleifer et al. (2013), (83)) and the r&d track record (Cohen et al. (2013),
(84)) appear to have predictive power for abnormal returns.
Group 18: accruals anomalies Sloan (1996) nds that higher accruals predict lower
returns (85). Modications include using a broader denition of accruals (Richardson et al.
(2005), 86), relying on abnormal accruals (Xie (2001), 87), or focussing on industries
in which accruals are likely to be more important (Chan and Jegadeesh (2006), (88)).
Thomas and Zhang (2002) argue that inventory changes scaled by total assets drive the
accruals anomaly (89), whereares Belo and Lin (2012) rely on the real net growth rate of
inventories (90).
Group 19: dividend anomalies Michaely et al. (1995) show that rms that initiate
dividend payments for the rst time tend to outperform (91). Boehme and Sorescu (2002)
uncover a similar behavior after dividend resumptions (92). Moreover, Benartzi et al.
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(1997) nd that rms that increase dividend payments in absolute terms outperform
(93). A similar result is found for changes of the dividend yield (e.g. Abarbanell and
Bushee (1998), (94)).
Group 20: earnings surprisesMany studies analyzing the post-earnings announcement
drift (e.g. Bernard and Thomas (1989)) rely on time-series forecast of expected earnings.
The resulting measure of unexpected earnings is often scaled by its historical standard
deviation (e.g. Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), (95)), or by the stock price (e.g. Livnat
and Mendenhall (2006), (96)). Other papers (e.g. Doyle et al. (2006), Hirshleifer et al.
(2009)) base their measurement of expected earnings on consensus analysts forecasts (97).
Still another approach of computing earnings surprises is the cumulative return around
the day of the announcement (e.g. Chan et al. (1996), (98)). Loh and Warachka (2012)
show that the market particularly underreacts to streaks of consecutive earnings surprises
of the same sign (99). Finally, Balakrishnan et al. (2010) document a loss/prot post-
announcement drift (100).
Table 1 displays the sample period and (where applicable) abnormal returns relative to
a Fama and French (1993) model for each of the 100 computed return anomalies. More
details on the construction of the anomalies are provided in the online appendix. In line
with the original studies, all return phenomena yield statistically signicant abnormal
returns relative to a Fama and French (1993) model. Averaged across anomalies of group
2 to 20, the average equally weighted (value weighted) abnormal return is 79 (70) bp per
month. Our screens on nominal share price and market capitalization might explain why
the overall dierence between equally weighting and value weighting returns is relatively
small. Unless noted otherwise and to conserve space, we thus report results from equally
weighted portfolios only.
Please insert table 1
For most parts of our empirical analysis, we group anomalies based on their underlying
economic intuition as well as based on the correlation structure of their abnormal returns.
By doing so it is intended to carve out the joint economic, institutional, or psychological
drivers of related individual anomalies, to maximize the sample period, and to facilitate
presentation. As indicated by the paragraph structure above, the procedure results in the
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construction of 20 \meta anomalies", which simply correspond to the equally weighted
average of the 2 to 17 constituent individual anomaly returns.
In this context, the meta anomaly concerned with deviations of the law one price is
distinct in at least three ways. First, it is partly based on data from international stock
markets. Second, violations of the law of one price are often considered to be among the
most undisputed and obvious mispricings. Third, the absolute level of deviations from
theoretical price parity is hardly comparable among the four settings which are part of
this meta anomaly. We thus standardize the four anomalies so that their mean is zero and
their standard deviation is one, before we aggregate them into meta anomaly 1.
Table 2 shows sample periods and selected characteristics of monthly returns for meta
anomalies 2 to 20. All anomalies produce large abnormal returns relative to a Fama and
French (1993) model. In line with the literature, several anomalies (momentum, short-
term reversal, lead-lag eects among economically linked rms, pairs trading, earnings
surprises) generate average abnormal monthly returns of at least 100 bp.
Please insert table 2
However, there is large time-series variation in the raw as well as the abnormal returns
of each anomaly. The dierence between the 10th percentile and the 90th percentile of
monthly returns is always several hundred bp. Can these large dierences at least in part
be linked to time-series variation in proxies deemed to quantify market-level arbitrage
constraints? We explore this question in the following sections.
3.2 Proxies for market-level arbitrage constraints
Our goal is to identify useful measures for the willingness and ability of speculators' capital
to put arbitrage capital at risk. We select these measures based on a literature survey,
and start by employing the following six variables which can be divided in three groups:
overall expected volatility and uncertainty, interest rate spreads, and constraints related
to transaction costs. Each group consists of two proxies, out of which one is available from
the 1920ies onwards, whereas the other one only covers a more recent time period.
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Overall expected volatility and uncertaintyWe consider the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Market Volatility Index (Vix), which reects the implied volatility of S&P index
options. Theoretical work suggests that higher expected volatility leads to tighter funding
constraints of speculators (e.g. Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009)). During times of high Vix, arbitrageurs may have hard times to raise money
from investors or to borrow it from lenders. Investors and lenders may even withdraw
their money, forcing arbitrageurs to unwind potentially protable positions prematurely
(e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb and Vayanos (2010)). They may also stem from
increased risk aversion and subsequent ight to quality phenomena (e.g. Vayanos (2004)).
There is also evidence that hedge funds reduced leverage and suered from outows in
phases of high Vix (Ang et al. (2011), Ben-David et al. (2012)). As Ang et al. (2006), we
rely on the old version of the Vix (denoted Vxo) as it starts four year earlier (in January
1986) and has been available in real time.
The Vix is highly positively correlated (.51) with an empirical estimation of aggregate
idiosyncratic risk which is deemed to be related to diversication concerns of arbitrageurs
(e.g. Ponti (2006), Akbas et al. (2013)). More precisely, we rst dene a stock's idiosyn-
cratic volatility for a given month as the standard deviation of the residual obtained from
regressing the daily excess return in that month on a Fama and French (1993) model. We
then compute the equally weighted average value of our eligible stock universe, starting in
the 1920ties. This yields an aggregate monthly measure, which builds on high-frequency,
non-overlapping data. Using a one factor or four-factor Carhart (1997) model generates
highly correlated measures, and inferences remain unchanged.
Interest rate spreads The Ted spread is dened as the dierence between the 3-month
LIBOR Eurodollar rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate. Short-term US government debt
is considered riskless, whereas the LIBOR rate additionally reects perceived credit risk
in interbank loans. In times of liquidity problems, the spread between both measures
typically widens due to a \ight to quality" or \ight to liquidity" phenomenon (e.g
Brunnermeier et al. (2008)). The Ted spread is thus by now a widely employed measure of
funding liquidity (e.g. Ang et al. (2011), Asness et al. (2012), Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), Moskowitz et al. (2012)). Similar arguments hold for a corporate credit spread,
dened as the dierence between Moody's BAA corporate bond rate and Moody's AAA
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corporate bond rate (e.g. Akbas et al. (2013), Engelberg et al. (2009)), which on a monthly
frequency is available from the 1920ties on.
Transaction costs We use the eligible stock universe to construct a monthly time-
series of average bid-ask spreads using the recently proposed algorithm in Corwin and
Schultz (2012). We also rely on the aggregate liquidity level as constructed in Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003). We multiply values by -1 so that a high level indicates illiquidity. In
times of high spreads or low liquidity, trading is likely to be more costly, which in turn
might aect the magnitude of seemingly anomalous returns (see e.g. Chordia et al. (2013),
Chordia et al. (2011), or Nagel (2013) for a motivation).
The upper half of gure 1 shows the time-series of each proxy. For presentation purposes,
the minimum (maximum) value for each variable is set to 0 (1). High values signal high
limits to arbitrage. The proxies appear to share a common component. For instance,
during the recent nancial crisis, they all indicate severe constraints. However, the average
correlation between the proxies is only .42. Thus, each variable also seems to capture
dierent aspects of market environments, which justies the separate consideration of all
proxies in the following tests.
Please insert gure 1
3.3 The impact of market-level arbitrage constraints on anomaly returns
Related work has relied on a broad range of regression approaches, including the use of
both predictive models and contemporaneous models, the use of both raw anomaly returns
and benchmark-adjusted anomaly returns, and the use of levels, changes, or (median-
based) dummies for market-level conditions (e.g. Akbas et al. (2013), Ang et al. (2011),
Frazzini and Pedersen (2013), Green et al. (2011), Stambaugh et al. (2012)). We consider
several combinations of these approaches to test for the sensitivity of our ndings.
To start as simple as possible, we run predictive regressions of the time-series of monthly
raw long-short returns on a dummy variable, which takes on a value of 1 (0) if a given arbi-
trage proxy was above (below) its median value in the previous month. From a conceptual
point of view, these regressions correspond to e.g. the baseline approach in Stambaugh
17
et al. (2012). However, inferences are qualitatively unchanged if we construct a dummy
based on rolling historical values in order to avoid any potential forward-looking bias.
The lower half of gure 1 shows the proxy-specic time-series of high and low limits to
arbitrage environments. The average correlation between the measures is .21.
We run univariate regressions for each pairwise combination of the 20 meta-anomalies
and the six proxies for limits to arbitrage. We also construct a composite anomaly which
simply is the average raw zero-cost return of all meta anomalies (2-20) available in a given
month. As an alternative approach, we run a panel regression with all meta anomalies
(2-20) and random xed eects. Table 3 and 4 show the main results.
Please insert table 3 and table 4
Several ndings are noteworthy. First, violations of the law of one price appear to be
heavily driven by limits to arbitrage. This type of mispricing becomes more severe fol-
lowing months of above-median Vix, idiosyncratic volatility, Ted spread, bid-ask spreads,
and illiquidity. Findings are not only statistically, but also economically signicant. As a
rough estimate, an above-median bid-ask spread in month t-1 is for instance associated
with a 3/4 standard deviation (=0.49) increase in violations of the law of one price in
month t. Similarly, an above-median level of average idiosyncratic volatility is associated
with a 2/3 standard deviation increase. Untabulated ndings show that a very similar
pattern is also found at a daily (as opposed to monthly) frequency.
Second, however, there appears to be, at best, a weak link between the magnitude of
the other meta anomalies and the dynamics of arbitrage constraints. Anomaly returns
only sporadically load on arbitrage risk factors in a statistically signicant matter in the
direction suggested by theory. Signicantly positively related to at least two proxies for
arbitrage constraints are only a handful of anomalies: short-term reversal, pairs trading,
innovation, and earnings surprises. With the exception of anomalies related to innovation,
a common theme of these phenomena is that they tend to require frequent trading. As
some proxies are directly (e.g. bid-ask spread) or indirectly related to costs of trading,
these ndings are in line with the limits to arbitrage argument when observed in isolation.
However, at least some of the above mentioned anomalies are not only unconditionally
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among the seemingly most protable ones, but they also generate large prots in periods of
low arbitrage constraints. For instance, depending on the specication, anomalies related
to earnings surprises appear to yield monthly returns of 70 to 120 bp if one explicitly
conditions on environments characterized by low limits to arbitrage. More generally, in
about 85% of all regression estimates for meta anomalies 2 to 20, there are statistically
signicant excess returns even in periods when market-wide conditions suggest hardly any
obstacles to arbitrage activities.
Similar insights are gained from attempts to measure the overall impact of limits to ar-
bitrage on anomaly returns: neither the composite meta-anomaly return nor the pooled
meta anomaly returns are signicantly higher following months of high arbitrage con-
straints, as quantied by any proxy. From an economic perspective, only the estimates for
idiosyncratic volatility seem meaningful, which indicate a 20 bp return dierence between
periods with high and low limits to arbitrage in the previous month.
However, we have relied on a simple binary variable of lagged market environments and
thus potentially have neglected useful information. We therefore replicate all regressions,
but now rely on the actual, continuous values of the arbitrage proxy. We moreover measure
these values contemporaneously although inferences do not change if we lag them. Table
5 displays the corresponding regression coecients.
Please insert table 5
The role of limits of arbitrage turns out to be a bit stronger, especially in case of the
Vix and of the illiquidity measure. About half of the 20 meta-anomalies and also the
composite anomaly measures are now signicantly positively related to the level of these
two variables. More specically, violations of the law of one price and anomalies related
to calendar eects, pairs trading, beta, distress, skewness, dierences of opinion, net stock
and nancing, and capital investment and growth appear to be most pronounced in illiquid
markets or when expected volatility is high.
However, these ndings are based on raw returns and thus do not explain whether ar-
bitrage proxies matter once one controls for the Fama and French (1993) factors, or, in
unreported tests with similar ndings, for the market factor only. We thus implement
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a two-stage regression as in e.g. Brennan et al. (1998) or Stambaugh et al. (2012). The
approach involves regressing the monthly time-series of raw returns of anomaly i (Ri;t) on
the market excess return (RMRF ), the small-minus-big factor (SMB), and the value-
minus-growth factor (HML).
Ri;t = bi + c1iRMRF t + c2iSMBt + c3iHMLt + i;t (1)
Benchmark-adjusted abnormal monthly returns are then dened as the sum of bi and
the tted value of i;t. The resulting series is then regressed on measures of arbitrage
conditions, analogously to table 5. Table 6 displays the main ndings.
Please insert table 6
The most important observation from this two-stage regression approach is that the im-
pact of proxies for limits to arbitrage on anomaly returns becomes even weaker. For
instance, neither the Vix nor market illiquidity are now signicantly positively related to
anomaly returns anymore. However, the link between violations of the law of one price
and arbitrage conditions remains stable. These ndings suggest that inferences about the
impact of market frictions on these special settings cannot simply be transferred to most
other anomalies and may represent a distinct phenomenon.
Table 7 shows that inferences do not change if we switch to a more disaggregated analysis.
We now run the analysis of table 6 separately for each of the 100 individual anomalies
and determine in each case whether the coecient obtained on the proxies for arbitrage
constraints is greater than zero and statistically signicant at least at the 10% level.
For presentation purposes, we aggregate these numbers within each meta anomaly. For
instance, table 7 uncovers that ve out of nine (56%) anomalies based on fundamental
analysis load positively on aggregate idiosyncratic volatility, but only one (11%) of these
anomalies does so in a statistically signicant matter.
The last row of the table averages the numbers across all (meta) anomalies and reveals
that the likelihood of positive coecients on arbitrage constraints is often not much higher
than the likelihood of negative coecients. Moreover, the average fraction of statistically
signicant loadings is low and ranges from 8% in the case of the Ted spread to 24% in
the case of idiosyncratic volatility.
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Please insert table 7
Taken together, the main insight from the investigation so far thus is that widely employed
proxies for market-level constraints to arbitrage activities appear to have surprisingly little
power to explain the time-series variation in the magnitude of a broad range of anomalies.
While previous work has sporadically revealed related ndings regarding the behavior of
specic anomalies and specic proxies3, our results suggest that the lack of explanatory
power is a phenomenon which is potentially far more general than commonly thought.
3.4 Robustness checks
The main inferences from the baseline analysis do not materially change after a number of
sensitivity checks which we briey describe in the following. For means of brevity, results
are not tabulated.
Changes vs. levels We decompose the contemporaneous level of the arbitrage proxies
(see table 5) into its value in month t-1 and its change from month t-1 to t. Alternatively,
we only rely on the change of the arbitrage proxies, and either on the level or the change
of anomaly returns.
Outliers We winsorize anomaly returns, arbitrage proxies, or both at the 99% level.
Value-weighted returns If we use value-weighted instead of equally weighted anomaly
returns, the role of arbitrage constraints appears to become even slightly weaker.
Non-linearitiesWe have experimented with a number of piecewise linear regressions, for
instance by regressing benchmark-adjusted anomaly returns on quintile dummy variables
times the arbitrage proxy under consideration.
Combined proxiesWe have experimented with dierent approaches to assess the overall
impact of market-level arbitrage proxies, for instance by aggregating the dummies in tables
3 and 4 to a single variable or by running multivariate regressions with all six proxies
3For instance, it is well known that momentum returns are negatively related to various measures of market volatility
and stress (e.g. Cooper et al. (2004), Daniel and Moskowitz (2013)). With regard to the low beta anomaly, Frazzini and
Pedersen (2013) nd that the lagged Ted spread negatively predicts abnormal returns which appears to be \inconsistent
with the model [of leverage constraints] if a high Ted spread means a tightness of investors' funding constraints" (p. 5).
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simultaneously. Performing the latter analysis analogously to the univariate approach
in table 6 yields, over the time period from 1986 to 2011, an R2 of 0.40 (0.05) for the
anomalies related to the law of one price (the average remaining anomaly).
Time trends and publication eects Even though there does not seem to be con-
sensus on this issue (see section 2.), there might be a negative time trend for anomaly
returns. This could aect our ndings to the extent that high and low limits to arbitrage
environments are clustered over time. To explore this issue, we include a linear time trend
variable in all regressions outlined so far. We have also experimented with subsamples,
such as testing distinct subperiods of 25 years length or excluding the recent nancial
crisis. The only notable deviation from our baseline ndings is that the impact of idiosyn-
cratic volatility often becomes stronger once one focuses on a more recent time period.
We also include a dummy variable which characterizes the (average) post-publication pe-
riod for meta-anomalies (see McLean and Ponti (2013)). The qualitative nature of our
insights does not change.
Timing and lags It might be the case that the impact of limits to arbitrage might not
show up in monthly data, but instead might matter at lower frequencies. However, most
proxies for arbitrage constraints exhibit substantial autocorrelation (see gure 1) so that
at least slow moving capital eects (e.g. Mitchell et al. (2007)) should partly be picked
up. We have nevertheless also re-run the analysis with quarterly data. As theory does
not oer a prior, we have experimented with dierent lag lengths between measures of
arbitrage constraints and anomaly returns. Our ndings remain similar.
Other proxies for market-level arbitrage constraintsWe have experimented with a
number of proxies deemed to measure the role of institutions likely to act as arbitrageurs,
the role of interest-related variables, and the role of price impact.4
4More specically, we have constructed a proxy for overall shadow banking activity as in Adrian et al. (2010). We have
also considered hedge fund index returns by following e.g. Menzly and Ozbas (2010) in relying on the Credit Suisse/Tremont
Long/Short Equity Hedge Fund Index. Moreover, we have constructed an aggregated abnormal stock return measure of the
nine investment banks relied on in Ang et al. (2011). Finally, we have experimented with the LIBOR, the term spread, and
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.
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3.5 Market-level arbitrage constraints and anomaly-level arbitrage activity
Do proxies for market-level arbitrage constraints go along with changes in anomaly-level
arbitrage activity? To explore this question, we build on recent work which proposes
novel measures to infer arbitrage capital invested to prot from specic strategies. These
variables are argued to reect factors that drive arbitrageurs' decision making process and
might be understood as anomaly-specic, time-varying arbitrage popularity barometers.
We compute the following variables for each of all 96 anomalies (groups 2-20), and then
aggregate them to 19 time-series at the meta anomaly level.
Changes in short interest Short interest should be most meaningful for stocks that
a typical trading strategy would recommend shorting. Consequently, shocks of short in-
terest in stocks entering the short leg of an anomaly, benchmarked against stocks in the
long leg, might signal changes in arbitrage activity (e.g. Hanson and Sunderan (2013) and
Hwang and Liu (2012)).We build on this intuition by constructing an arbitrage popularity
measure based on short interest data for NYSE and AMEX stocks obtained from Com-
pustat. As there is an upward trend in market-wide short selling activity over time (e.g.
Hanson and Sunderan (2013)), we focus on relative measures (e.g. McLean and Ponti
(2013)). In each month, we rank all eligible stocks based on their short interest and assign
a continuous value from 0 (lowest short interest) to 1 (highest short interest). We then
compute the dierence between the average short interest rank of the stocks contained in
the short and long leg of the anomaly portfolio in a given month. An untabulated analy-
sis shows that, with the exception of anomalies related to lead-lag eects or innovation,
the dierence is (often highly signicantly) greater than zero on average. This suggests
that there is indeed an attempt to exploit these anomalies, which in turn indicates that
changes in short interest (from month t-1 to t) might help to draw a conclusion about
sophisticated market participants behavior.
Trading activity Increased arbitrage activity has also been shown to manifest itself
in higher turnover for those stocks that a typical anomaly would speculate on (see e.g.
McLean and Ponti (2013)). We again construct a rank-based measure as the time-series
of the average rank of trading activity in the long and short leg of each anomaly. We then
aggregate this variable at the meta-anomaly level and compute the monthly change.
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Our regression framework mirrors the approach in table 5. The only dierence is that we
now use the monthly change in the average short interest rank (long portfolio-short port-
folio) or the monthly change in the average turnover rank (0.5*long portfolio + 0.5*short
portfolio) as dependent variable. Due to length concerns, we here only report results for
the Vix, the Ted spread, and the average bid-ask spread. Using the other three proxies
from the baseline analysis leads to similar results. The same holds true for a number
of plausible changes in methodology.5 The major insight from table 8 is the following:
proxies for market-wide limits to arbitrage are at best only loosely related to changes in
anomaly-level arbitrage activity. Virtually all regression coecients are insignicant. In
other words, the relative amount of capital invested in those anomalies does not, in the
overall picture, seem to exhibit pronounced shocks in turbulent market conditions. The
analysis thus appears to conrm the insights from the baseline analysis.
Please insert table 8
4. Conclusion
Are there market-wide economic barriers which prevent sophisticated market participants
from capitalizing on abnormal returns? The idea that such limits to arbitrage are often
binding and thus oer a convincing rationale for the survival of alleged mispricings has
gained much interest in recent years. However, in contrast to these predictions, our nd-
ings on the dynamics of 100 cross-sectional well-known or recently discovered phenomena
reveals that return anomalies appear to be surprisingly large in magnitude even in times
when market wide limits to arbitrage are commonly thought to be low. The unobservabil-
ity of arbitrage activities clearly make it hard to arrive at strong inferences. We believe
it is nevertheless justied to conclude that our ndings collectively support the emerging
stream of literature which highlights some limits in the large work on limits to arbitrage.
5More specically, we have experimented with relying on raw (instead of Nasdaq-adjusted) turnover or relying on short
interest data also for Nasdaq stocks (from 2003 on, instead of solely relying on NYSE/AMEX). We have rerun the regressions
with levels of (instead on changes) in short interest and turnover. We have also used dollar trading volume instead of turnover.
We have relied on value weighted (instead of equally weighted) anomaly returns. Finally, we have also included the Fama
and French (1993) factors in the regression.
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Table 1: Sample periods and abnormal returns of individual return anomalies
This table provides an overview over all 100 individual anomalies relied on in this paper.
ID is a running number to identify anomalies in section 3.1. Start and End characterize the
sample period. Where applicable, 3factor alpha reports average monthly intercepts (in %)
from time-series regressions of the long-short anomaly return on a Fama and French (1993)
model. Reported are alphas for both the equally weighted (ew) and the value weighted (vw)
version of anomaly returns. In the case of pairs trading, there is no distinction between equally
and value weighted returns for conceptual reasons. The online appendix gives more detailed
information about the construction of each anomaly. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based
on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980). Statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
ID Start End Anomaly name 3factor
alpha
(ew)
t-stat 3factor
alpha
(vw)
t-stat
(vw)
1. Anomalies related to violations of the law of one price
1 Aug-91 Sep-02 Twin stock anomaly Anomalies related to the law of one price
2 Jan-90 Dec-08 Cross-listed shares anomaly are standardized so that their mean
3 Jan-87 Dec-11 Dual-class shares anomaly is zero and their standard deviation is one
4 Jul-65 Feb-11 Closed-end fund anomaly (see section 3.1)
2. Momentum anomalies
5 Aug-26 Dec-11 Standard momentum 1.014*** (8.08) 0.915*** (6.64)
6 Sep-26 Dec-11 Age-enhanced momentum 1.232*** (9.52) 1.305*** (8.90)
7 Aug-26 Dec-11 Turnover-enhanced momentum 1.179*** (9.10) 1.207*** (8.38)
8 Jan-72 Dec-11 Market-to-book ratio-enhanced momentum 1.457*** (6.75) 1.301*** (5.44)
9 Feb-86 Dec-11 Credit rating-enhanced momentum 1.520*** (4.22) 1.292*** (3.40)
10 Sep-26 Dec-11 Size-enhanced Momentum 0.714*** (4.61) 0.768*** (4.80)
11 Jan-80 Dec-11 (Residual) analyst coverage-enhanced momentum 1.002*** (4.46) 0.790*** (2.87)
12 Jan-80 Dec-11 Forecast dispersion-enhanced momentum 1.071*** (4.14) 0.983*** (3.51)
13 Mar-29 Dec-11 R2-enhanced momentum 0.926*** (7.17) 0.973*** (6.01)
14 Aug-26 Dec-11 Return consistency-enhanced momentum 1.520*** (8.82) 1.444*** (8.23)
15 Jul-28 Dec-11 (Idiosyncratic) volatility-enhanced momentum 1.034*** (8.31) 1.154*** (7.37)
16 Aug-26 Dec-11 52 week high-enhanced momentum 1.442*** (9.70) 1.349*** (8.45)
17 Aug-26 Dec-11 Formation period return-enhanced momentum 1.334*** (8.73) 1.327*** (7.87)
18 Oct-26 Dec-11 Signed volume-enhanced momentum 0.732*** (7.70) 0.544*** (5.33)
19 Apr-80 Dec-11 Change in breadth of ownership-enhanced momentum 1.010*** (4.03) 0.924*** (3.61)
20 Aug-26 Dec-11 Continuous information-enhance momentum 1.455*** (9.10) 1.304*** (7.95)
21 Jan-27 Dec-11 Intermediate momentum 0.714*** (6.28) 0.863*** (6.23)
3. Technical analysis anomalies
22 Oct-26 Dec-11 250 day moving average anomaly (deciles) 0.602*** (2.99) 0.606*** (2.75)
23 Oct-26 Dec-11 200 day moving average anomaly (deciles) 0.388** (1.99) 0.392* (1.84)
24 Oct-26 Dec-11 250 day moving average anomaly (dummy) 0.357*** (3.55) 0.205** (2.04)
25 Oct-26 Dec-11 200 day moving average anomaly (dummy) 0.238** (2.42) 0.113 (1.18)
26 Feb-69 Dec-11 250 day moving average anomaly (25% band) 1.464*** (5.23) 1.299*** (4.09)
27 Feb-69 Dec-11 200 day moving average anomaly (25% band) 1.350*** (4.52) 1.274*** (3.69)
4. Short-term reversal anomalies
28 Jul-26 Dec-11 Short-term reversal 1.116*** (7.35) 0.541*** (3.08)
29 Aug-28 Dec-11 Industry residual return-enhanced short-term reversal 1.715*** (15.08) 1.282*** (9.34)
5. Long-term reversal anomalies
30 Mar-31 Dec-11 Long-term reversal 0.177* (1.82) 0.002 (0.02)
31 Mar-31 Dec-11 Idiosyncratic volatility enhanced-long term reversal 0.499*** (4.57) 0.481*** (3.40)
6. Calendar-based anomalies
32 Jan-31 Dec-11 Seasonality momentum 0.700*** (7.47) 0.705*** (5.50)
33 Sep-72 Dec-11 Earnings announcement premium 0.555*** (6.54) 0.663*** (4.79)
34 Jan-65 Dec-11 Dividend month anomaly 0.563*** (7.33) 0.438*** (4.17)
7. Anomalies related to lead-lag eects among economically linked rms
35 Jan-81 Dec-05 Customer-supplier anomaly 0.975*** (3.77) 1.032** (2.35)
36 Jan-77 Dec-11 Complicated rms anomaly 1.252*** (5.52) 0.665*** (2.77)
8. Pairs trading anomaly
37 Jan-62 Dec-08 Pairs trading (6 months, conservative) 0.716*** (9.99) 0.716*** (9.99)
38 Jan-62 Dec-08 Pairs trading (6 months) 0.874*** (11.78) 0.874*** (11.78)
39 Jan-62 Dec-08 Pairs trading (1 month, conservative) 1.227*** (13.65) 1.227*** (13.65)
40 Jan-62 Dec-08 Pairs trading (1 month) 1.542*** (16.64) 1.542*** (16.64)
9. Beta anomalies
41 Jul-27 Dec-11 Low beta anomaly (high frequency) 0.890*** (6.81) 0.814*** (5.26)
42 Aug-29 Dec-11 Low beta anomaly (low frequency) 0.685*** (5.48) 0.590*** (4.13)
43 Dec-26 Dec-11 Low volatility anomaly (high frequency) 0.984*** (7.54) 0.827*** (4.86)
44 Dec-28 Dec-11 Low volatility anomaly (low frequency) 0.819*** (6.64) 0.737*** (4.81)
[continued overleaf]
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10. Distress risk anomalies
45 Oct-72 Dec-11 Distress risk (Campbell et al. (2008)) anomaly 1.405*** (7.15) 1.347*** (5.10)
46 Nov-71 Dec-11 Distress risk (Ohlson (1980)) anomaly 0.787*** (7.31) 0.678*** (5.19)
47 Jul-51 Dec-11 Distress risk (Shumway (2001)) anomaly 1.067*** (6.38) 0.999*** (6.67)
48 Jan-86 Dec-11 Bond credit rating anomaly 0.646*** (3.68) 0.573** (2.41)
49 Feb-86 Dec-11 Bond credit rating changes anomaly 0.701*** (2.82) 0.985*** (3.09)
11. Skewness anomalies
50 Jan-27 Dec-11 Lottery-type stocks anomaly 0.463*** (6.71) 0.529*** (6.52)
51 Jul-26 Dec-11 Maximum daily return anomaly 1.318*** (12.33) 0.959*** (6.63)
52 Aug-36 Dec-11 Expected skewness anomaly 0.510*** (4.40) 0.474*** (3.73)
12. Anomalies related to dierences of opinion
53 Feb-76 Dec-11 Analyst forecast dispersion anomaly 1.338*** (9.31) 1.173*** (5.98)
54 Jul-26 Dec-11 Turnover anomaly 0.741*** (6.52) 0.503*** (3.86)
55 Jul-29 Dec-11 Idiosyncratic risk anomaly (low frequency 1) 0.623*** (5.66) 0.488*** (3.21)
56 Jul-64 Dec-11 Idiosyncratic risk anomaly (low frequency 2) 0.990*** (6.41) 0.960*** (5.45)
57 Jul-64 Dec-11 Idiosyncratic risk anomaly (high frequency) 1.020*** (7.54) 0.998*** (6.48)
13. Anomalies related to industry eects
58 Jul-62 Dec-11 Procyclical stocks anomaly 0.312*** (2.83) 0.523*** (3.03)
59 Jan-65 Dec-11 Sin stocks anomaly (industry-based measure) 0.156 (1.29) 0.377** (2.37)
60 Feb-92 Dec-10 Sin stocks anomaly (rating-based measure) 0.197* (1.81) 0.0707 (0.49)
14. Fundamental analysis anomalies
61 Jul-75 Dec-11 F-Score anomaly 1.062*** (4.73) 1.071*** (3.66)
62 Jul-75 Dec-11 Firms strength anomaly 0.260** (2.37) 0.432*** (2.63)
63 Nov-75 Dec-11 Sales - inventories anomaly 0.869*** (9.24) 0.805*** (4.84)
64 May-72 Dec-11 Gross margin -s ales anomaly 0.497*** (5.77) 0.196 (1.46)
65 May-72 Dec-11 Administrative expenses - sales anomaly 0.342*** (3.32) 0.082 (0.47)
66 May-74 Dec-11 Change in leverage anomaly 0.373*** (4.38) 0.551*** (3.68)
67 Feb-72 Dec-11 Change in gross prot margin anomaly 0.445*** (5.33) 0.134 (1.04)
68 Mar-72 Dec-11 Return on assets anomaly 1.266*** (7.04) 0.993*** (4.95)
69 Jul-51 Dec-11 Gross protability anomaly 0.631*** (5.63) 0.922*** (7.43)
15. Net stock and nancing anomalies
70 Jul-31 Dec-11 Composite equity issuance anomaly 0.646*** (7.84) 0.588*** (5.93)
71 Jul-52 Dec-11 Annual issuance anomaly 0.671*** (9.29) 0.574*** (5.80)
72 Jul-63 Dec-11 Net external nancing anomaly (1) 0.734*** (7.26) 0.609*** (4.51)
73 Jul-72 Dec-11 Net external nancing anomaly (2) 0.798*** (7.90) 0.650*** (4.05)
16. Capital investment and growth anomalies
74 Jul-65 Dec-11 Net operating assets (change) anomaly 0.571*** (4.74) 0.533*** (3.13)
75 Jul-63 Dec-11 Net operating assets (levels) anomaly 0.704*** (5.59) 0.495*** (3.50)
76 Jul-52 Dec-11 Capital investments anomaly 0.571*** (6.68) 0.342*** (3.07)
77 Jul-53 Dec-11 Capital expenditures anomaly 0.294*** (3.63) 0.327*** (2.82)
78 Jul-52 Dec-11 Asset growth anomaly 0.356*** (3.22) 0.145 (1.17)
79 Jul-74 Dec-11 Advertising anomaly 0.345*** (3.09) 0.200 (0.95)
17. Anomalies related to innovation
80 Jul-60 Dec-11 R&D to market equity anomaly 0.339** (2.43) 0.282** (2.16)
81 Jul-75 Dec-11 R&D growth anomaly 0.436*** (2.89) 0.411*** (3.05)
82 Jul-80 Dec-11 Patent citation anomaly 0.377* (1.94) 0.327 (1.35)
83 Jul-82 Dec-11 Innovative eciency anomaly 0.163** (1.98) 0.267** (2.01)
84 Jul-80 Jun-10 Innovation predictability anomaly 0.648** (2.04) 0.824* (1.77)
18. Accruals anomalies
85 Jul-65 Dec-11 Classical accruals anomaly 0.514*** (4.50) 0.547*** (3.48)
86 Jul-52 Dec-11 Accruals (broadly dened) anomaly 0.365*** (4.27) 0.202 (1.63)
87 Jul-72 Dec-11 Abnormal accruals anomaly 0.535*** (6.20) 0.494*** (2.97)
88 Jul-71 Dec-11 Industry-enhanced accruals anomaly 0.574*** (3.46) 0.395 (1.50)
89 Jul-52 Dec-11 Inventory change anomaly 0.514*** (6.19) 0.360*** (3.15)
90 Jul-52 Dec-11 Inventory growth anomaly 0.482*** (5.64) 0.262** (2.24)
19. Dividend anomalies
91 Jul-26 Dec-11 Dividend initiation anomaly 0.263*** (3.23) 0.126 (1.27)
92 Feb-45 Dec-11 Dividend resumption anomaly 0.332** (2.30) 0.078 (0.46)
93 Jan-65 Dec-11 Change in dividend (absolute level) anomaly 0.256** (2.24) 0.463** (2.25)
94 May-72 Dec-11 Change in dividend yield anomaly 0.493** (2.43) 0.494* (1.74)
20. Anomalies related to earnings surprises
95 Nov-73 Dec-11 PEAD (computation scheme 1) 1.303*** (10.19) 0.803*** (5.01)
96 Nov-72 Dec-11 PEAD (computation scheme 2) 1.319*** (9.41) 1.005*** (5.42)
97 Jul-84 Dec-11 PEAD (computation scheme 3) 0.999*** (8.33) 0.686*** (3.42)
98 Nov-71 Dec-11 PEAD (computation scheme 4) 1.246*** (11.78) 1.030*** (6.10)
99 Nov-84 Dec-11 Streaks in earnings surprises anomaly 0.773*** (7.62) 0.707*** (4.84)
100 Feb-72 Dec-11 Prot/loss anomaly 1.204*** (6.46) 1.108*** (5.12)
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